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Abstract
Interest in research on heroism has begun to increase during the past
decade, but, despite the ancient roots of heroism embedded deeply in cultures
around the world, empirical work on the subject is relatively sparse. Direct and
explicit empirical study of heroism in organizational contexts, specifically, is
especially rare. The lack of organizational heroism research is surprising. There is
a preponderance of evidence that organizational wrongdoing is observed across
many organizations, sometimes to great extremes that are in violation of federal
law, and it can have profound social impact. Organizational members who
become aware of extreme wrongdoing committed by others are likely to
experience negative cognitive and emotional states. Such states may require
innocent organizational members who are aware of wrongdoing committed by
others to engage in courageous, risky, and self-sacrificial behaviors in an effort to
expose and end misconduct, often without any external benefit for taking action.
These courageous actors are often heroic. Although a better understanding of
heroic decision-making in organizations has the potential to curtail organizational
and larger societal harm, no measurement instrument exists to assess the heroic
cognitions of organizational members that may predict the likelihood that they
will engage in heroic behaviors. In response to this gap in the literature, the
present research sought to develop and explore the dimensionality of a measure of
heroic cognition for workplace contexts. Using principal axis factoring for
exploratory factor analysis with oblique factor rotation, four factors were
extracted, accounting for 27.46% of the variance. After dropping the fourth factor
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of no theoretical import, and the third factor due to low internal reliability, two
factors remained: heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice. Formal
content validation with a jury of social psychological SMEs, however, failed
across all items in the retained factors. Potential item content confounds, lengthy
and complex item wording, and the direct assessment of single-method selfreported heroic cognitions limited both the interpretability of the results and the
utility of the scale for future research. Future research should further develop
measures of the retained heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice
scales to circumvent the issues cited by the content validation panel. Initial
construct validation studies using the revised scales should borrow methodologies
from the change-oriented organizational citizenship behaviors literature, using a
multi-trait multi-method approach that seeks to develop a nomological network
for workplace heroic cognition. The present research provides the foundation for
more targeted follow-up research efforts on heroic decision-making in
organizations.

3
Introduction
Organizational wrongdoing is both prolific and impactful. Nearly every
organization has reported workplace deviance (Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz,
2005), and as many as three of every four employees have engaged in some form
of deviant workplace behavior, from unscheduled absenteeism, to computer fraud,
theft, sabotage, or vandalism (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The cost organizations
pay for deviance is considerable. On average, the mean financial expense of
deviant and fraudulent acts is approximately 5% of organizations’ annual revenue
(ACFE, 2010). Given the United States of America’s GDP for 2012 (National
Income and Product Accounts, 2013), this amounts to an annual failure-ofvigilance “tax” of approximately $784 billion across domestic organizations.
Although most deviant behaviors may be mild in scope (e.g., unscheduled
absence for a single day of work), the cumulative effect is worthy of attention.
Occasionally, individual and group acts of deviance themselves command
attention. Cases of mass-scale organizational fraud, corruption, and criminality
appear frequently in the media and are pervasive across every type of
organization. In the business arena, Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme alone cost
unwitting investors billions of dollars and endured for more than a decade
(Henriques, 2009). In the public sector, the international image of the United
States was tarnished when detainees in the Abu Ghraib military prison were
subjected to demeaning and inhumane treatment by members of the US military
(Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2009). Even in nonprofit institutions of learning, we
see cases of people like Diederik Stapel, from our own field of psychology, who
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committed research fraud in as many as 55 papers to help him achieve
publications (Enserink, 2010; Neuroskeptic, 2012; Cooper, 2013).
With such startling prevalence across every genre of work, there is a need
to combat destructive organizational wrongdoing. Often, however, the punitive
systems that reprimand wrongdoing and wrongdoers are unaware of a problem
until courageous organizational members rise to the occasion to expose it. The
literature has long-recognized such heroic individuals (Nader, Petkas, &
Blackwell, 1972; Miceli & Near, 1985; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012),
but has only recently begun to better understand the antecedents of the choice to
act against perceived wrongdoing (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). Explicit
research on heroic action in organizations is exceedingly sparse. Especially given
the vision of tomorrow’s business leaders for an evolved socioeconomic model
(The Deloitte Millennial Survey, 2014), and the call to create and foster more
ethical values, pro-social conduct, and effective organizational outcomes
(Lefkowitz, 2005), further work is needed on the application of moral and selfless
decision-making paradigms (e.g., Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2012) to the
workplace.
The proposed research is an effort to refine the manner in which
psychologists study heroic behavior in the workplace. To-date, heroism has been
conceived of as a behavioral outcome of individual traits (e.g., Hughes-Hallet,
2004) and contextual influence (e.g., Miceli & Near, 1985), but there have been
few empirical attempts to explicitly define the heroic decision-making process. It
has been suggested that heroic imagination, heroic cognition that includes
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“awareness of opportunities to voluntarily act in self-sacrificing ways for the
greater good,” may be the distinct psychological construct of interest (Heroic
Imagination Project, Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2009); however, no attempt has
been made to develop or test a direct empirical measure of heroic cognitions.
Optimizing the operationalization and predictability of heroic cognition may
improve our capacity to combat organizational fraud and deviance. The proposed
research, therefore, will attempt to develop and validate a scale of heroic
cognition for use in workplace contexts.
Heroism Literature Review
The concept of heroic behavior is a complex and contentious topic in the
literature (Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo, 2011). Its operationalization and
categorization is often grounded more in folklore than in science, initially derived
primarily from literary legend and historical figures. The traditional view of
heroism relies on the identification of exemplars that demonstrate face-valid
heroic behaviors, actions, and qualities. Via written and oral tradition, examples
of heroes (e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ghandi, FDR, medal of honor
recipients,…etc.) become comparison cases by which individuals decide whether
their own actions or those of others witnessed in the media, for instance, are
heroic (Medin, 1989, p.1472-1473). This view postulates that there exists a
“Heroic Elect” that, by virtue of exceptional gifts/abilities, are empowered to act
heroically (Hughes-Hallet, 2004).
The traditional exemplar categorization of heroes, while conceptually
useful, requires synthesis and integration in order to render it suitable for
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empirical exploration. Recent conceptual arguments in the literature have
suggested that heroic behavior has certain universal characteristics that apply
across heroic contexts (e.g., Becker & Eagley, 2004; Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo,
2011; Rankin & Eagley, 2008). Heroic actions in diverse situations all share the
following characteristics (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).
(1) The act must be voluntary.
(2) The act must involve potential physical risk or profound social
sacrifice.
(3) The actor must be willing to accept the consequence(s) of her or his
action.
(4) The act must be in the service of others and performed without
expectation of extrinsic gain.

These general characteristics of heroism can be observed in all heroic
subtypes within the recently-proposed heroism taxonomy (Franco, Blau, &
Zimbardo, 2011, p.102). Heroic behavior can be broadly classified in one of two
general categories based upon the genre of potential jeopardy in which individuals
may find themselves by choosing to act. An individual who acts heroically may
either face physical peril, social sacrifice, or both. Although the subtypes of
heroic action are numerous (twelve in total), all may be found in organizational
contexts.
Heroic subclasses are not mutually exclusive within the specified
taxonomy (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011, p.102), but still provide some
conceptual utility. Physical peril heroes may be military/duty-bound individuals
that go above and beyond the call of duty, or civil heroes that choose to act
despite the lack of formal duty-binding rules. Social sacrifice heroes may be
labeled in one or more of ten subclasses, including bureaucracy heroes and
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whistleblowers, religious, politico-religious, and political leaders, Good
Samaritans, underdogs, martyrs, adventurers/discoverers, and scientific heroes. It
is notable that social sacrifice heroes of any category may also be exposed to
physical peril (e.g.- assassination attempts, murder threats,…etc) for the work
they do in the social sphere. Nevertheless, because the five principles of heroic
behavior apply across all subtypes, the taxonomy functions primarily to provide
the specific contexts within which a heroic actor will encounter distinct barriers to
action.
Given the operationalization of heroic behavior and specification of heroic
subtypes, it follows that heroic cognition must encompass an awareness of what is
required to act heroically. Although heroic cognition requires a state of mental
readiness to act pro-socially and self-sacrificially, there has been no attempt to
create a measure to assess individual readiness for heroic action. The very limited
body of literature suggests that it may be four-dimensional (Franco, Blau, &
Zimbardo, 2011). More specifically, heroic cognition has been conceived of as (1)
Specific self-efficacy in one’s ability to achieve pro-social goals in a particular
situational context, (2) Conscious awareness of the situations that should compel
one to take action for an ethical cause and the situations that should not
(recognition of boundary conditions), (3) Acknowledgment of barriers to success
should action be chosen, (4) The courageous acceptance of personal sacrifices that
may result if action is taken.
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Heroic Cognition: Related Constructs and Antecedents
Heroic cognition is likely to be a higher-order factor, related to other
similar constructs and predicted by individual difference antecedents (Franco,
Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). Inherent to the construct is empathic awareness of
others’ plight, a sense of voluntary duty to meet others’ needs in a pro-social way,
readiness to promptly respond to needs, courageous acceptance of the potential
for self-sacrifice required by the choice to act, and the confidence that action may
produce desired change. The literature already contains some operationalizations
that are highly-relevant to the above factors: proactivity, altruism and concern for
others, and specific self-efficacy.
Proactivity. The heroism literature has arrived at a critical moment in the
history of world economies. The economic landscape is becoming more
challenging, and organizational members must often bear the brunt of it. There is
evidence to suggest that the modern economy demands more of employees than
ever before (Parker & Ohly, 2008). Agents of change in the world of work
include globalization, increasing pace of business, increasing competition in the
marketplace, increasing education of employees, market instability, and rapidlyfluctuating organizational resources (Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008). A
“New Deal” psychological contract has arisen, in which employees have often
become temporary “partners” of organizations, rather than long-term “members of
the family” as in the paternalistic organizations of the past (Parker & Ohly, 2008).
Under this new psychological contract, organizations must demand a new
standard of workers. Employees now have less-defined job roles and titles, and

9
often do the duties that once were assigned to two, three, or more people. Work is
more socially demanding, more emotionally laborious, and more cognitively
taxing, requiring employees to be better self-regulators of their cognitions, affect,
and behaviors (Frese & Fay, 2001; Boswell et al, 2008; Parker & Ohly, 2008).
Employees of today must use self-regulation tactics to rise to the novel demands
posed by the New Deal psychological contract of the modern working world, a
chief demand of which is engaging problematic organizational policies.
Prompted by an earlier article that introduced the concept (Bateman &
Crant, 1993), a promising vein of research has developed over the past 15 years
concerning the need for self-regulation of initiative at work, known as the
construct proactivity (Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997; Parker & Sprigg, 1999).
Recognizing the dissolution of the more traditional system of narrowly-defined
job titles and descriptions, Parker and colleagues’ research over the past decade
has examined whether proactive personality predisposes employees to be more
successful in increasingly challenging and dynamic workplaces. Generally,
research has affirmed that proactivity is an important trait for successful
employees to possess, and has numerous desirable individual and organizational
outcomes (Parker & Sprigg, 1999; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010).
While reasons for choosing to act proactively at work are infinitely varied,
the challenges posed by both informal and formal rules and regulations that fail to
meet the needs for which they were intended may be among the most important
reasons. As many of us find our work roles within the organizations that employ
us integral to our self-concept (Super, 1951; Erikson, 1959; Galinsky & Fast,
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1966), organizational and business rules and regulations are likely to be quite
salient to many of us in determining our behaviors and the behaviors of those
around us throughout much of our lives. Coupled with the understanding that the
modern economy demands skillful self-regulation, situational work cues may
persuade some employees to believe that the burden of deviance (positive or
destructive) from a stagnant or malignant norm falls to themselves, as individuals
seeking a better outcome than that which the rules provide.
Altruism and Concern for Others. There has been some criticism that
heroic cognition is not conceptually distinct in theory from altruism (Eagly, &
Becker, 2005; Shepela et al., 1999), prompting a thorough response article that
clarifies the differences between the constructs (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo,
2011). Altruistic and heroic behaviors do have some overlap on three dimensions.
Both are performed voluntarily, without expectation of extrinsic gain, and in the
service of others.
Concern for others (Simon, 1990) is likely an antecedent of both altruistic
and heroic behaviors. Organizational members whose value systems include
strong other-oriented values are more likely to forgo a preeminent interest in their
own personal outcomes, instead directing their behaviors towards helping and
coordinating with others (Korsgaard, Meglino, & Lester, 1997). Even when
helping others requires that organizational members engage in extra-role
behavior, adding to the workload of their required job duties, individuals high in
other-oriented values are still more likely to choose to help others than focus on
their own personal outcomes (McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Korsgaard, Meglino, &
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Lester, 1997). Although both altruistic and heroic behaviors are predicated upon
concern for others, heroic behaviors have a far higher risk threshold for action.
To be heroic, one must recognize that self-sacrifice, even the greatest
sacrifice of one’s life itself, may well be a necessary correlate of taking action.
Furthermore, heroic actors often endure ridicule or status as outcasts and targets
for their actions, while altruistic actors often benefit socially from their acts even
if such benefits were not intentionally planned (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011,
p.104). Although both may benefit from their actions, heroes may create enemies
by their actions that altruistic actors certainly do not (e.g., holding the door for
your coworkers will not provoke retaliation, but standing up to an abusive boss on
behalf of a coworker might). Those with heroic cognition, therefore, go beyond
altruism, in their willingness to accept such sacrifices.
Self-Efficacy. Heroic actors in organizational contexts are often faced
with ethical dilemmas that require courageous and, sometimes, rapid action. The
timescale of action in organizational contexts, however, is not as extreme as it is
for heroic actors in action teams or military contexts where the actor must make a
split-second decision in a matter of a few seconds (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo,
2011). Organizational members that are presented with ethical challenges,
therefore, have more time to plan their actions and to consider possible outcomes.
During the evaluation period of challenging organizational stimuli, organizational
members considering action must assess how capable they themselves are of
achieving the goal of resolving organizational problems.
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Social-Cognitive Theory suggests that organizational members who have
specific self-efficacy in the domain of heroic action are more likely to act when
they encounter ethical challenges in the organizations for which they work. Selfefficacy is defined as a critical piece of self-regulation of goal directed behavior,
the outcome of triadic reciprocal causation (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura,
1989). Reciprocal determinism posits that individuals and their environments are
both the determinants and determiners of each other (cause and the effect in
constant flux). We behave as a result of a bidirectional, simultaneous interaction
between personal factors (e.g., traits, such as personality, and states, such as
mood), and environmental factors (e.g., work environmental influences, such as
organizational climate). An organizational member faced with a challenge that
requires heroic action, therefore, must have heroic specific self-efficacy, a belief
in her/his ability to successfully resolve organizational issues that are in conflict
with her/his value system. If individuals considering action have themselves
achieved success in the past when engaging ethical dilemmas, they also will be
more likely to choose to challenge future ethical dilemmas.

Applying Heroic Cognition to Workplace Contexts
Whether or not heroic cognition proves to be empirically distinct,
predicting relevant criteria over and above other correlated predictors, there are
numerous veins of research in the literature that suggest heroic cognition may be a
relevant factor. Specifically, heroic cognition may predict organizational
deviance, organizational members working outside the established structures of
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bureaucracy in response to perceived organizational problems or breaches to
ethics (Warren, 2003). Deviance may manifest itself as pro-social and
constructive or anti-social and destructive.
Recently, it has been suggested that the manifestation of deviance as
positive or destructive can be framed as a choice paradigm for proactive
individuals (Warren, 2003). In this way, both positive and destructive deviance
may be considered as anchors on either end of a spectrum of possible behavioral
outcomes in response to unethical or ineffective organizational practices, each of
which is subject to similar antecedents and cognitive mechanisms.
Deviance is best understood by considering the role of group normative
control. Organizational policies (ethical or unethical), and the members that act
according or counter to them, result in the formation of organizational norms.
Group norms are de facto social rules that generally characterize and govern
group member behavior (Hackman, 1976; Feldman, 1984). Norms arise from
policies and statements made by managers and peers, precedents set by historical
events, initial behaviors demonstrated at group formation, and other norms
brought in by new members who were not originally part of the group.
These informal social rules generally develop quickly and are maintained
and propagated because they serve a variety of essential functions for the group,
including ensuring group survival, expediting social exchanges by defining
desirable behaviors, delimiting behaviors that might be injurious to the group’s
goals or its members, and classifying central markers that define a group’s
identity (Feldman, 1984). As normative control of group member behavior is
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essential to maintaining group identity and function, it is likely that the efforts of
proactive individuals in organizations may generally be better received by the
groups in which they operate if they conform to established norms. Because
norms play key roles in group identity and survival, it is not surprising that the
literature has generally condemned the negative influence of group members who
deviate from organizational norms, regardless of positive or destructive intent.
Destructive deviance. The literature has formally recognized deviant
workplace behaviors, volitional actions that violate the social norms of an
organization, for some time (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Bordia, Restubog, &
Tang, 2008). Deviant behavior at work can be identified by three central
characteristics: it is done intentionally, it violates formal social expectations, and
it is directed either at the organization as a whole (organizational deviance) or at
members within it (interpersonal deviance) (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).
Deviance is traditionally seen in the literature as revenge behaviors that
employees may engage in because they are motivated by a negative affective
state, due to psychological contract breach (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008), and
perceptions of injustice (Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Such behaviors have
received significant empirical attention primarily because they may cause
organizational or interpersonal harm (Bensimon, 1995; Bennett & Robinson,
2000; Burroughs, 2001).
Positive/constructive deviance. Few would argue that harmful revenge is
a productive response to negative affect and cognitions in the workplace, but there
is evidence to suggest that revenge alone does not sufficiently represent the full
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spectrum of workplace deviance. Destructive deviance is only one part of the twosided deviance literature (Warren, 2003). A second vein of deviance literature
suggests that deviant organizational behavior, when properly executed, may be
responsible for desirable organizational and broader societal outcomes.
Constructive/positive deviance (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004) has been
studied under a variety of operationalizations, including, among others, whistleblowing (Near & Miceli, 1995; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003),
workplace voice (Klass, Olson-Buchanon, & Ward, 2012), organizational
expedience (McLean Parks, Ma, & Gallagher, 2010), felt responsibility for
constructive change (Fuller, Marler & Hester, 2006), minority dissent (De Dreu &
West, 2001), and pro-social rule breaking (Morrison, 2006). Organizations would
far prefer individuals to react to negative cognitive states and perceptions of
psychological contract breach with constructive, rather than destructive, intent
and behaviors.
Broadly, the argument for how constructive deviance occurs can be
described within the framework of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Individuals
who perceive themselves to be heroic may be more likely to intend to behave
heroically and to actually engage in heroic action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Phrased differently, heroic attitudes and beliefs about the self, arising from
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs towards one’s capacity for heroic action
in a particular context (Ajzen, 2012), may predict heroic intentions and,
ultimately, heroic behaviors. The decision-making pathway for heroic action,
therefore, likely begins with heroic behavior intentionality. Contextual factors
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within an organizational situation will moderate the expression of heroic
behavior, but foundational heroic intentions may still be of use and import
(Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). However, neither a formal established
pathway for heroic-decision making, nor the process for the development of
heroic cognitions about the self exists in the literature. Furthermore, establishing
such pathways is beyond the scope of this research. The present research seeks
only provide organizations and researchers with a measure that can be used to
assess individuals’ self-efficacy to act heroically, acceptance of self-sacrificial
consequences, awareness of contexts that require heroic action, and
acknowledgment of barriers they may encounter. Coupled with extant models of
organizational citizenship behaviors, a scale of heroic cognition could provide
applied utility to help reduce destructive deviance and increase courageous selfsacrificial behaviors that enhance organizational and social value, and provide a
basis for more research on heroic decision-making.

Rationale
Organizational policies and members can sometimes be unjust, unethical,
immoral, and harmful. For those members who encounter such problematic
systems and behaviors, the choice must be made to either engage in remedial
action or not, and, if so, to meet perceived problems with heroic self-sacrifice or
destructive deviance. Understanding and fostering heroic cognition in
organizational members may be one method of encouraging pro-social OCB’s,
but empirical measurement of the construct is required before its criterion-related
validity can be established in organizational contexts.
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The proposed research answers the call (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011)
to better understand the construct of heroic cognition. Organizational members
who are prepared to act heroically when situational demands require courage
behaviors may be more likely to act pro-socially than destructively. To-date, no
such measure of heroic cognition exists in the published literature. The primary
goal of the proposed research, therefore, is the creation and initial validation of a
scale of heroic cognition.
Research Question
Research Question I. What is the underlying dimensionality of heroic cognition in
workplace contexts?
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Method
Research Participants
Participants were introductory psychology course students from a large
university in the Midwest region of the United States of America (nobserved = 251).
The target sample size to attain a minimum number of participants for factor
analysis of the 40-item heroic cognition scale was 200 participants (target
minimum n/k ratio = 5:1; Nminimum = 200 participants; Shultz & Whitney, 2005,
p.314).
The participants were predominately female (68%) with a lesser
representation of males (32%). The mean age of participants was 20.18 years (SD
= 3.54 years), and ages ranged from 18 to 47 years. The racial composition of the
sample was mostly white (54%) or Latino/Hispanic (21%). Participants specifying
that they were of black, South Asian, East Asian, Middle Eastern, or Native
American descent composed less than 10% of the sample each. Most participants
were of Catholic (42%) or other Christian (27%) religions, with a notable
minority of Agnostics (12%). Participants specifying that they were of Jewish,
Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, or Atheist religions composed less than 10% of the
sample each.
Development of the Heroic Cognition Scale
In accordance with widely-accepted recommendations for scale creation
(Hinkin, 1998), development of the heroic cognition scale proceeded through
several steps. These steps included item generation for the heroic cognition scale,
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questionnaire administration to an initial set of participants, exploratory factor
analysis, and content validation with a jury of subject matter experts.
Items for the heroic cognition scale were generated by a deductive method
based on prior content validation efforts in the literature (Franco, Blau, &
Zimbardo, 2011). Heroic cognition has been conceived of as (1) Specific selfefficacy in one’s ability to achieve pro-social goals in a particular situational
context, (2) Conscious awareness of the situations that should compel one to take
action for an ethical cause and the situations that should not (recognition of
boundary conditions), (3) Acknowledgment of barriers to success should action
be chosen, and (4) The courageous acceptance of personal sacrifices that may
result if action is taken (Fraco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).
Because the heroic cognition scale was intended for use in applied
organizational settings, functional brevity was desired if scale reliability was not
greatly negatively impacted (Shultz & Whitney, 2005, p.55-56). Given the
specified dimensions of heroic cognition theorized, ten items were created for
each, for a total of forty initial items before factor analysis and content validation
item reduction (Appendix A). This method was estimated to result in a final scale
containing one-third to one-quarter the number of initial items (DeVellis, 1991).
Scale were written using a closed-ended, Likert-type response scale format (1 =
Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree), as this approach has been used to
successful effect in related altruism research (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken,
1981). Qualtrics software was used to upload the heroic cognition scale items and
a set of demographic questions to the internet, where introductory psychology
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course students from a large university in the Midwest region of the United States
of America were permitted to answer the questions in their own time from any
remote location.
Although there was some theoretical basis to expect a four-factor structure
of the heroic cognition construct, there was no prior empirical evidence to
confirm it. Principal axis factoring was, therefore, used to explore the underlying
theoretical factor structure of the heroic cognition construct (Fabrigar, Wegener,
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999).
A panel of academic psychologists was assembled to critically examine
the content validity of the heroic cognitions scale obtained from exploratory
factor analysis. The panel contained six social psychology graduate school
students pursuing either a master’s or doctoral degree, and two experienced social
psychology faculty members with doctoral degrees (npanel = 8). Social psychology
experts were chosen because the heroic cognition theory literature is rooted in the
social psychological tradition.
A content validity ratio (CVR) methodology was used to formally assess
the content validity of the scale (Lawshe, 1975). CVRs provide quantified
evidence of whether or not scale items are considered by subject matter experts to
be essential measures of a proposed construct. Panel members were given a list of
all items retained after principal axis factoring and item reduction, and asked to
rate the criticality of the items in measuring, specifically and respectively, the
heroic self-efficacy, acceptance of self-sacrifice, and awareness of contextual
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constraints dimensions on a three-point scale (1 = not necessary, 2 = useful, 3 =
essential).
The content validity ratio for each item was calculated according to
Lawshe’s (1975) formula for CVRs from the validation panel ratings obtained.
This formula is, in essence a ratio of the total number of SMEs providing ratings
subtracted from the number of SMEs rating an item as essential, divided by the
total number of raters (i.e., [(nessential-(Ntotal/2))/(Ntotal/2)]). Each CVR calculated
was compared to the critical values table in the literature for minimum needed
ratios corresponding with the size of the validation panel (Lawshe, 1975). Items
that fail to meet critical CVR values are, by the CVR method alone, considered to
be poor measures of a construct. Panel members were also asked to provide
qualitative feedback for the usefulness and face validity each item. Content
validation results were compared with factor analysis results, such that CVR
values, panel member commentary, and EFA extraction results were all
considered simultaneously in establishing the preliminary validity of the heroic
cognition scale.
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Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis and Scale Internal Reliability
The factor structure of the 40-item Self-Report Heroic Cognitions scale
(Appendix A) was assessed using principal axis factoring for exploratory factor
analysis (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). Promax rotation was
used because factor intercorrelations within each factor solution explored were
greater than 0.20 (Hendrickson & White, 1964) (Table 1). Examination of the
scree plot and eignevalues suggested several possible factor solutions (Figure 1).
Several iterations of principal axis factoring were, therefore, performed,
specifying two, three, four, or five factors. Within each iteration, items in the
structure matrices produced by the various factor solutions were not retained in
the factor structure if they had loadings less than 0.40 or cross-loadings greater
than 0.40. Factor structure beyond a four-factor solution was difficult to interpret.
Solutions of two and three factors resulted in factors containing items that
spanned multiple theoretical boundaries. A four-factor solution was selected
because it minimized these issues.
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Figure 1. Scree plot of principal axis factoring extraction with promax rotation. A
four factor solution was chosen based upon a combination of the scree plot,
eignevalues observed, proportion of variance accounted for, interpretability of
factor loadings, and alignment with heroic cognition theory.

Table 1
Heroic Cognition: Retained Factor Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Interrcorrelations
Eigenvalue
Factor
M
SD (% variance acct. for)
1
2
3
1. Heroic Self-Efficacy
3.55
0.55
6.52 (16.75%) (0.76)
2. Acceptance of Self-Sacrifice

3.25

0.28

1.70 (4.35%)

0.55

(0.61)

3. Awareness of Contexts

3.54

0.06

1.39 (3.57%)

0.34

0.45

(0.38)

Note. Factor reliabilities are in the diagonal of the correlation portion of the table. Factor scores were the
mean of retained items within each dimension.

In the four factor solution, evidence of common factors and favorable
partial correlations among the items was observed (KMO = .82). Bartlett’s test of
sphericity led to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the item correlation matrix
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was an identity matrix, χ2 (741, N = 251) = 2491.20, p < .001. Twenty-one items
were retained after item reduction criteria were applied. However, item loadings
within the four-factor structure produced unexpected results.
Only 27.5% of items loaded onto the factors anticipated by deductive item
generation from existing theory on heroic cognitions. All reverse-coded items
loaded onto one factor, regardless of the intended theoretical content of the items.
Reasons for this can only be speculated. An exploratory descriptive statistics
analysis of the mean scores of reverse-coded items suggested that item means for
reverse-coded items did not differ on average by more than approximately 0.100.30 scale points (scale of 1-to-5 points) from other similar items, and a
participant-by-participant analysis suggested that most participants detected the
negative wording of these items. However, the mean differences were likely
enough to cause the pattern of reverse-coded items to be extracted as an
independent factor. After removing the fourth factor containing only reversecoded items, 14 items remained. Of the remaining 14 items, 8 items loaded onto
the first factor, 3 items loaded onto the second, and 3 items loaded onto the third.
The first factor, containing 8 items, was labeled heroic self-efficacy
because it reflected self-reported belief in one’s ability to engage in heroic action
(eigenvalue = 6.52; 16.75% of the variance). Items included, “I am completely
confident that I have the ability to make a radical positive change in this world for
the benefit of others” (α = .76). The second factor, composed of 3 items, was
labeled acceptance of self-sacrifice because it reflected a willingness to be selfsacrificial for others’ well-being (eigenvalue = 1.70; 4.35% of the variance). Items
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included, “I would rather sacrifice my most treasured dream for my own life than
fail to act on behalf of others in need” (α = .61). The third factor, containing 3
items, was labeled awareness of contextual constraints because it reflected
acknowledgment of external forces that would impact one’s efforts to affect
outcomes of their heroic action (eigenvalue = 1.39; 3.57% of the variance). Items
included, “I would not be able to govern all of the outcomes of my attempts to
confront wrongdoing at my workplace” (α = .38). Given the low number of items
on factors two and three, and that the content of the items within the respective
subscales asked about varied contexts that may be likely to produce variability in
responses (Appendix A), it was perhaps unsurprising that subscale reliabilities
were as low as observed. Because internal consistency of the third factor was
poor, the third factor was eliminated from further analyses. The final solution
included two factors and 11 items (Table 2).
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Table 2
Items of the Heroic Cognition Scale Retained After PAF and Reliability Analysis
Subscale
Item
Heroic self-efficacy
I think of myself as a courageous person of action.
When I hear stories in the news of people doing
heroic things, I firmly believe that I could do them
too if I were ever in the same situation.
I know how to successfully confront people who
are more powerful than I am when their abuse of
authority is harmful to others.
I am completely confident that I have the ability to
make a radical positive change in this world for the
benefit of others.
If I saw my boss doing something illegal, I would
have the courage to report my boss to the proper
authorities.
Even as an employee with a low-level position, I
could make my voice heard if I witnessed
wrongdoing around me on the job.
I know that I must occasionally do something bold
on behalf of others to make a positive difference at
my workplace.
Nothing can get between me and my goals of
achieving a more ethical workplace.
Acceptance of
self-sacrifice
I would rather risk my own life for others’ benefit
than to live a safe life for only myself.
I would rather sacrifice my most treasured dream
for my own life than fail to act on behalf of others
in dire need.
My actions at work demonstrate that I am
concerned for others more than I am for myself.
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Content Validity
A panel of SMEs rated the criticality of items for the heroic self-efficacy,
acceptance of self-sacrifice, and awareness of contextual constraints factors.
Because the panel contained eight SMEs, the critical CVR cutoff value for an
item to be considered essential was 0.75 (Lawshe, 1975). All items failed to reach
a sufficient CVR to support the content validity of the heroic cognitions scale
(range of obtained CVRs: -1.00 to 0.25). Alone, the CVRs obtained indicated that
SMEs did not think any of the scale items across the factors were sufficient
measures of their stated constructs. The scale also generated considerable
contentious discussion among the panel members, and the construct of heroic
cognition was debated at length. Because content validation had failed, the panel
was asked to provide additional perspectives regarding why items were judged to
be poor measures of the heroic cognitions construct. Panel members cited several
concerns.
The items were considered to have been too comprehensive and lengthy,
effectively providing participants who responded to the survey with definitions of
the entire heroism construct. Panel members indicated that item wording,
therefore, made items difficult to answer and responses difficult to interpret. The
item content of several items was also directly questioned. Panel members
indicated that some items may be measuring other constructs in addition to or
instead of heroism. Example items in question included, “I think of myself as a
courageous person of action” and “Nothing can get between me and my goals of
achieving a more ethical workplace,” which were judged by panel members to
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measure, at least in part, narcissism. For these example items that were judged to
measure narcissism, panel members argued compellingly that making strong
statements about the self as a courageous person who cannot fail in their efforts in
these contexts may measure heroic cognitions in part, but also measure selfadmiration, entitlement, and/or arrogance. Lastly, panel members expressed
concern that the study design of attempting to measure self-reported heroic
cognitions directly was too overt and likely subject to response bias for social
desirability. Ultimately, the validation panel advised either alternative research
methodologies for more subtle examination of the heroism construct, or a
narrower study of subcomponents of the cognitive processes involved in heroic
decision-making.
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Discussion
Major Findings and Implications
Research on heroism in the literature is growing. Recent research efforts
have sought to propagate the belief that, with conscious self-awareness, all
individuals are capable of a common sort of everyday heroism that transcends
social contexts and some individual characteristics (Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo,
2009; Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011; Zimbardo, Breckenridge, & Moghaddam,
2013; Zimbardo & Wang, 2011). However, the thought process in which people
engage to determine whether or not to act heroically has not yet been addressed in
the literature with an empirical approach to the measurement of heroic cognition.
Establishing a decision-making pathway to engage in heroic action is
beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, justification for why the present
research sought to create a scale of heroic cognition assessing behavioral
intentionality as a valid approach to furthering research efforts in this field is
warranted. Broadly, intentions are one aspect of a potential pathway for heroic
decision making. The theory of planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)
suggests that heroic self-perceptions and pro-heroic attitudes in situ arise from
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs towards one’s capacity for heroic action
within a particular context (Ajzen, 2012). These self-perceptions may be
preliminary elements in a reasoned action approach to the decision-making
pathway to engage in heroism. Although intentionality alone is unlikely to be
deterministic, such fundamental self-perceptions may be precursors to action,
even in the presence of contextual constraints. These cognitions are likely to have
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pragmatic utility for modern organizations. The author concedes that this
measurement approach is limited (e.g., Norman, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2003), but it
is perhaps useful given the preliminary nature of research efforts studying
heroism. Future research may benefit from operationalizing heroism in diverse
ways.
Beyond rationale for why the chosen measurement approach was selected,
there is also a gap in related organizational literature on the construct. To-date,
application of the heroism construct to modern workplace contexts that are
fraught with potential to engage in heroic action has not necessarily been explicit.
Rather, the organizational literature contains primarily assessments of only related
constructs characterized broadly under the umbrella of a group of special
organizational citizenship behaviors (Organ, 1988) known broadly as
constructive/pro-social deviance (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004).
The present research, therefore, attempted to deductively develop a
pioneering measure of heroic cognition from heroism theory for use in workplace
contexts (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). Results from exploratory factor
analysis of the heroic cognition scale indicated that heroic self-efficacy and
acceptance of self-sacrifice appear to be the most promising dimensions of
heroism for further measurement development in future heroic cognition research
(Table 1). These two factors emerged from exploratory factor analysis with the
strongest and most simply-structured item factor loadings, accounted for the most
variance of extracted factors, and exhibited the highest internal consistency of
measurement (Table 2).
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It is notable, however, that content validation results were, in some ways,
contradictory to the emergence of factors in EFA. A discussion of why
discrepancies may have existed is given in more detail in the following pages.
Overall, more weight was placed on the content validation panel’s critiques, as
such critiques offered insights into the shortcomings of the measure that the
author believes must be addressed in a revised approach to measurement. Given
their critical nature, pre-eminent reliance on the content validation responses is
also a more conservative approach to further developing the literature on heroism,
which is likely to produce higher-quality research efforts.
Heroic self-efficacy, one’s belief in one’s ability to engage in heroic
action, emerged as the strongest factor with the greatest number of items and
accounted for three-to-four times more variance than other factors. This indicates
that individuals found the heroic self-efficacy items on the heroic cognition scale
to be most salient and answered them most cohesively, yielding the most
favorable pattern of partial correlations observed among items within that factor.
Drawing upon the broader and extensive literature on Self-Efficacy Theory
(Bandura, 1977), the emergence of this factor may suggest that one’s efficacious
beliefs about one’s ability to be heroic are critical to one’s heroic self-concept.
Although the factor emerged with strong factor loadings and moderate
internal reliability, content validation for the heroic self-efficacy items failed.
These results are inconsistent and reasons concerning why are only speculative.
Nevertheless, the comments provided by the content validation panel provide
some insights concerning how this paradox occurred. Validation panel SMEs
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indicated that items were too comprehensive, lengthy, and potentially confounded
with elements of anti-social trait measures, simultaneously providing participants
who responded to the survey with definitions of the entire heroism construct and a
consistent assessment of self-admiration, entitlement, and/or arrogance. This
observation was perhaps especially true for heroic self-efficacy items (Appendix
A). Participants, therefore, may have interpreted the items as a cohesive block of
measures assessing one central construct, which yielded a favorable factor
statistically. The content of those items in the emergent factor, however, does not
reflect the intended construct of heroic self-efficacy alone. This explanation
accounts for the apparent discrepancy between successful emergence of a heroic
self-efficacy factor, but unsuccessful content validation.
A search of the literature for heroic self-efficacy specifically yielded no
direct prior empirical exploration of the construct. Related organizational
psychology literature exploring change-oriented organizational citizenship
behaviors (OCBs) suggests that the decision-making process to act may be
complex and contextual. In a structural equation model of change-oriented
OCBs, role-breadth self-efficacy was an important predictor of taking action, but
felt-responsibility for constructive change was an even stronger predictor (LópezDomínguez, Enache, Sallan, & Simo, 2013). Both role-breadth self-efficacy and
felt responsibility for constructive change were also preceded in the path by
contextual factors, such as developmental leadership, an innovative climate, and
resource availability. These results indicate that the decision to engage in pro-
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social organizational action is contingent upon context, climate, emotional
cognition, values, and perceived competence in one’s job role.
There is also evidence that change-oriented OCBs are contingent upon
psychological empowerment (Choi, 2007) and an individual’s identification with
his/her work unit (Seppala, Lipponen, Bardi, & Pirttila-Backman, 2012).
Applying these findings to the operationalization of heroic cognition in this
research, heroic self-efficacy alone is unlikely to be deterministic. Although
organizational contexts requiring heroic action are more extreme and require selfsacrifice in ways that exceed the demands of many other change-oriented OCBs,
the effect of heroic self-efficacy on taking organizational action is likely also
dependent upon similar factors.
Concerning the second factor, it was not surprising that acceptance of selfsacrifice emerged as a key component of the heroic cognition construct because
self-sacrifice has been consistently identified in the literature as a critical
dimension of heroic action (e.g., Becker & Eagley, 2004; Franco, Blau, &
Zimbardo, 2011; Rankin & Eagley, 2008). This research may suggest further
evidence that individuals recognize the role of self-sacrifice in the heroic
decision-making process. However, the extent to which acceptance of selfsacrifice is unique to the heroism construct and goes beyond that of altruism
(Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981) remains unclear.
Furthermore, although the factor emerged, internal reliability was notably
poor and only three items loaded successfully onto the factor. Given the wide
array of contexts assessed in the items hypothesized to load onto acceptance of
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self-sacrifice (Appendix A), the author argues that the scale produced such varied
responses that cleaner pattern loadings on the factor and consistency of
individuals’ responses across items within the factor were elusive. This may also
help to explain why none of the SME ratings for the self-sacrifice items indicated
items were essential. In summary, poor factor psychometrics and lack of support
by SMEs are congruent results that both suggest future efforts might seek to more
narrowly define contexts in the items for this factor.
Several works have debated this issue. Earlier arguments on the subject
specified that courageous resistance, a subset of altruistic behavior and congruent
with the definition of heroism used in the present research, is distinct from
altruistic and bystander intervention behaviors because courageous resistance is
more continual, risky, and premeditated (Shepela et al., 1999). Similarly, civil
courage, brave reactive behaviors that seek to demonstrate discontentment to
formal authority about policies or events, requires greater responsibility, more
empathy, and is less likely to lead to universally-desirable outcomes than simple
helping behaviors (Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Frey, 2006). Most
recently, it has been argued that heroic action is more self-sacrificial, and that
heroic actors choose to behave heroically with knowledge of the likely risks and
without thought of tangible benefits to the self (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).
Although the emergence of self-sacrifice as a dimension of heroic
cognition is, therefore, congruent across related literatures, there is contentious
debate surrounding motives for self-sacrificial action. Some have argued that selfsacrificial behavior is only engaged in when the sacrifice is made on behalf of kin
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(Hamilton, 1964), when the actor expects reciprocity from those for whom the
behavior was chosen (Trivers, 1971), or as a “costly signal” to draw attention to
one’s favorable traits (McAndrew & Perilloux, 2012; Zahavi, 1977). Additionally,
most people endorse the ideal that self-sacrifice, even to the point of death, is an
admirable choice; yet, when they are presented with hypothetical scenarios that
would require them to sacrifice their lives for others, people are far more likely to
say they would lay down their life for others in a group to which they feel
affiliated or “fused” than for strangers (Swann et al, 2014). In contrast, others
have argued that self-sacrificial decisions are made without thought of benefits to
the self except to confirm one’s morality and beliefs in the preeminence of virtue,
even when action is taken on behalf of others who have wronged the selfsacrificial actor in the past (Turillo Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).
There are contrasting arguments for why people engage in self-sacrificial
behaviors, but this author favors the argument that self-sacrifice is undertaken to
affirm and remain congruent with one’s morality. Such an argument is also
congruent with the theory of heroism that self-sacrifice is undertaken on behalf of
others with no thought of external gain (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).
Nevertheless, expectations of reciprocity, intending to signal virtuosity to upper
level management with the hopes of signaling one’s readiness for promotion, or
acting only on behalf of one’s work unit to which one feels intensely affiliated
(not necessarily for the benefit of all) may also explain some outwardly pro-social
OCBs. Whether or not OCBs that arise from more selfish motives can still be
categorized as “heroic” is primarily subject to rhetorical debate, an issue beyond
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the scope of this work. Ultimately within the scope of this research, the author
encourages further exploration of the unique role of acceptance of self-sacrifice in
predictive models of self-sacrificial organizational action.
The other two emergent factors from factor analysis in this research were
less promising. The third factor, awareness of contextual constraints, was not
reliably measurable, and accounted for only a very small amount of the variance.
Furthermore, it contained only 3 items, two of which were originally written for
what was anticipated to be a fourth factor (acknowledgment of barriers to
success). Reviewing the content of the acknowledgment of barriers to success
items suggests that participants may have interpreted its items to be of a highlysimilar nature as the awareness of contextual constraints items (Appendix A).
Contexts that should compel one to take action may inherently possess qualities
that are indicative of barriers individuals might encounter in the choice to act
heroically or not (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). Although the awareness of
contextual constraints factor was not usable due to low reliability (Table 1), future
scale development efforts should consider the theoretical overlap of context and
barriers.
The fourth emergent factor contained only reverse-coded items and
exhibited content from all four originally-anticipated factors. Heroism theory
provided no explanation for this factor (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011), as it
appeared to provide no import beyond checking for data quality by comparing
these item’s scores to scores on factors in other items to ensure that individuals
were not answering at random. The literature confirms that the use of a mixture of
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reverse coded items beyond this purpose may be ill-advised (Streiner & Norman,
1995).
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The study’s greatest strength was its reliance upon existing heroism theory
in the literature. Items were deductively derived directly from existing discourse
in the literature to create a heroic cognition scale for workplace contexts (Franco,
Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). The theoretical underpinnings of the scale were further
enhanced by the potential relationships between heroism and existing constructs
in the organizational literature (e.g., Organ, 1988; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004;
Warren, 2003). Given the prevalence of harmful organizational deviance in
modern organizations (e.g., Henle, Giacalone, & Jurkiewicz, 2005; Robinson &
Bennett, 1995), research exploring more constructive organizational members’
reactions to negative cognitive and emotional job states is timely. Additionally,
the study benefited from statistical validity, as the dimensionality of the construct
of heroic cognition was formally assessed via methods of exploratory factor
analysis advised in the literature (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan,
1999).
There were, however, notable limitations to the study design. Although the
author received some feedback from peers in the field in the item-writing stage of
the research, formal content validation prior to any data collection and pilottesting may have been advisable. A thorough review of the literature was
undertaken prior to item-writing (Broome, 2000), but pilot-testing (DeVellis,
1991) was not done and content validation (Lawshe, 1975) was only completed
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after data collection. Having completed pilot-testing and content validation prior
to data collection may have helped to circumvent item length and wording issues,
and potential content confounds within the items identified by the SME rating
panel. Completing this process at an earlier stage may also have revealed the most
notable limitation of the study: directly assessing self-report heroic cognition may
not be the best approach to studying the construct.
Some aspects of the heroic cognition construct as defined in this research,
including feeling efficacious in the ability to act heroically and acceptance of selfsacrifice, may be useful predictors of heroic intentions and behaviors (Fishbein &
Azjen, 1975). However, the direct measurement of self-perceptions of one’s own
heroic attitudes and beliefs is likely subject to response bias that may limit the
utility of the construct for organizational application. The experimental design of
this research allowed individuals to respond anonymously to heroic cognition
scale survey questions online from the privacy of any location they desired.
Nevertheless, participants may have answered questions to match their
perceptions of the most socially-desirable answers, rather than responding
truthfully in accordance with their actual attitudes and beliefs (Paulhas, 1991;
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Future research on the heroic cognition construct
should include measures to assess social desirability (e.g., Jacobson, Brown, &
Ariza, 1983).
Furthermore, the present research examined only self-perceptions of
heroic cognition, not others’ perceptions of one’s capacity for heroic action.
Although others’ perceptions of one’s heroic potential are likely to be subjective

39
and varied (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011), a multi-rater methodology that
assesses both self and others’ ratings may provide more compelling evidence of
the construct validity of heroic cognition (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Platt, 1964).
Follow-up heroic cognition scale analyses were initially planned for a
second set of data, as advised in the methodology literature (Hinkin, 1998), but
exploratory factor analysis and content validation results did not mandate further
testing. Planned analyses in a second study included confirmatory factor analysis
to verify scale dimensionality, a test-retest reliability analysis, and a predictive
model of intentions to engage in heroic action to establish initial convergent,
discriminant, divergent, and predictive validity of the heroic cognition scale.
However, further scale development that is informed by the results observed is
needed prior to follow-up scale validation.
More specifically, the exploratory factor analysis results in the present
research suggest that the two most promising heroic cognition dimensions for
revision and development may be heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of selfsacrifice. Follow-up scale development efforts might include additional pre-data
collection qualitative methodologies, such as focus groups (Carry, 1994) or a
phenomenological approach (Crabtree & Miller, 1992), to ensure that items
capture sufficient breadth and depth of the two dimensions. It would also be
advisable to simplify item wording and shorten item length to make the items
more accessible to less-advanced levels of reading comprehension (Fry, 1977).
The revised measures should then be tested with a separate second set of
data (Hinkin, 1998). Ultimately, an organizationally-contextual predictive applied
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model should be tested that includes other theoretically-related and distinct
constructs to establish a nomological network (Landy, 1986) for initial
convergent, discriminant, divergent, and predictive validity. Borrowing the
methods from related change-oriented OCB research is a logical progression after
scale revision and further exploratory factor analysis (e.g., López-Domínguez,
Enache, Sallan, & Simo, 2013). For example, a structural equation model
including identification with work unit (Shepela et al, 1999), psychological
empowerment (Choi, 2007), and felt responsibility for constructive change
(Morrison & Phelps, 1999) as mediators in the predictive relationship between the
antecedents of heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice, and the
outcome of organizational heroic action (measured via a hypothetical scenario),
could provide clarity regarding the role of these heroic cognition dimensions in
the organizational heroism decision-making pathway. Modeling contextual
organizational factors may also reveal boundary effects of the motivational value
of heroic self-efficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice (Dutton & Ashford, 1993).
Conclusion
The present research attempted to advance the growing but limited
heroism literature by creating a multi-dimensional measure of heroic cognition
that can be used to generate more empirical discourse on the study of heroic
action in workplace contexts. Further scale development and refinement is needed
prior to initial validation studies. It is notable that direct operationalization of the
theorized dimensionality of heroic cognition (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011)
was not supported by much of the factor analysis results or any of the content
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validation results in the present research. Because of the methodological
limitations of the author’s work, it is unclear whether the failure to produce a
factor structure specified in the literature is more attributable to lacking theory or
researcher misspecification in operationalization of the theory. However, at least
part of the proposed factor structure was supported. The emergence of heroic selfefficacy and acceptance of self-sacrifice as key dimensions of heroic cognition
indicates potential for further research using at least a portion of the framework
here established. It is the firm opinion of the author that future integrative work
that seeks to combine related literatures on civil courage, courageous resistance,
constructive deviance, and heroism with change-oriented organizational
citizenship behaviors has the potential to meaningfully impact both theory and
practice in the organizational and broader social psychological literatures.
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Appendix A
Heroic Cognition Scale
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The heroic cognition scale was developed for this research. It was conceptually
derived from Franco, Blau & Zimbardo (2011), Zimbardo & Wang (2011), and
Blau, Franco, & Zimbardo (2009).
Heroic self-efficacy
I would be able to stand up against unethical policies at my workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I think of myself as a courageous person of action.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I am confident that I could confront my coworkers if I saw them doing something
wrong.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

If I saw my boss doing something illegal, I would have the courage to report my
boss to the proper authorities.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would feel powerless to confront unethical behaviors that I witnessed at work.
REVERSE CODE
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
If coworkers behave unethically, I would have no power to confront them.
REVERSE CODE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I could never stand up to injustice. REVERSE CODE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree
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If I saw a coworker committing fraud, I would be unable to stop them. REVERSE
CODE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Even an employee with a low-level position can make their voice heard when
they witness unethical behaviors on the job.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I possess the ability to be heroic at work if I need to be.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Acceptance of self-sacrifice
I could sacrifice my job if doing so is the only way to achieve justice at my
workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

My actions at work would demonstrate that I am concerned for others more than I
am for myself.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would be motivated to take action for my beliefs at work because I want to
improve my position in life. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I accept that I may need to make personal sacrifices at my job for the greater good
of the organization.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree
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I accept that I will need to make personal sacrifices at my job in order to help my
coworkers achieve what they have rightfully earned.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would rather protect my own interests than take action for others. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would be prepared to accept being fired to stand up for an important cause at
work.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would rather be considered an outcast at work than fail to confront unethical
behaviors of my coworkers.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

As long as I was progressing towards my professional goals, I could accept
workplace policies that I did not think were fair to others. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would not care that my workplace has unethical policies, as long as my career
was not harmed by them. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Awareness of contextual restraints
Sometimes, I may feel the need to speak up at work, even if doing so might make
my work life more difficult.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree
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I would feel personally responsible to commit myself to an ethical cause at work
if people might be at risk of harm from my employer.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I know that I must occasionally do something bold on behalf of others to make a
positive difference at my workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I should always take action against my employer for what I believe, even if doing
so would make the jobs of my coworkers more difficult. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for the organization as a whole.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for my coworkers.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I should only take a stand for what I believe at work if the situation would be
likely to produce an outcome that is desirable for myself. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Some situations might compel me to take a stand at work because my workplace
would be a worse environment if I did not.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree
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I would fight an organizational policy I did not agree with until I got my way,
even if the policy was relatively unimportant. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Policies at my workplace are only worth challenging if they are unethical.
REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

Acknowledgement of barriers to success
I know that I would need a good strategy to overcome obstacles that would
prevent me from achieving a good cause at my workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would have to overcome barriers in order to take a successful stand for
something I believe in at my job.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

If my coworkers were doing something unethical, they would try to prevent me
from exposing them.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I will not be able to govern all of the outcomes of my attempts to confront
wrongdoing at my workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I have thought about things that might cause me to fail if I were to take a stand for
something I believe in at my workplace.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree
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Nothing can get between me and my goals of achieving a more ethical workplace.
REVERSE
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree

If my boss was doing something unethical, she or he would not try to prevent me
from exposing her or him. REVERSE
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

I would likely have to adjust my strategy from time-to-time when confronting
wrongdoing at my workplace.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
There would be forces of influence beyond my control that would impact how
successful my attempts to expose wrongdoing at my workplace would be.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

There would likely be informal policies in place at my organization to punish
people who “snitch” when they see coworkers doing something unethical.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly Agree

